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Abstract: To assess the targeting performance of community-based development activities and 
deduce the impact of such activities on poverty reduction, we implemented a survey of a 
non-governmental organization (NGO) in northwestern Pakistan. A distinct characteristic of this 
NGO is that it is managed mostly by women and its interventions are conducted through 
community-based organizations (COs), most of whose members are also female. This 
characteristic is rather unusual for a male-dominated society like Pakistan. Descriptive analyses 
of village, CO, and household level data shows that the NGO was able to target poorer villages. 
Villages with COs are characterized by lower adult literacy rates, lower availability of basic 
amenities, and higher susceptibility to natural disasters. With regard to household-level welfare 
indicators—such as consumption, women’s empowerment, children’s school enrolment, and the 
weight-for-age of infants—we found that the consumption levels of CO member households 
tended to be lower than that of households in non-CO villages. However, the difference between 
CO member households and non-member households in CO villages was insignificant, possibly 
owing to the mixing of the selection effect (i.e., poorer households are served by the NGO) and 
the causal effect of interventions on poverty reduction. On women’s empowerment and child 
schooling, CO member households tend to perform better than other households, suggesting the 
favorable impact of the interventions and/or the self-selection of such households vis-à-vis 
program participation. 
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1. Introduction 
As a poverty-reduction strategy in developing countries, a larger emphasis has been 
placed in recent years on the role of the community (Binswanger-Mkhize et al., 2010). 
According to Mansuri and Rao (2004, pp.1-2), “community-based development” is an umbrella 
term for projects that actively include beneficiaries in their design and management, while 
“community-driven development” refers to community-based development projects in which 
communities have direct control over key project decisions. Such community participation is 
expected to contribute to the efficiency, accountability, and transparency of poverty reduction 
policies through the utilization of local information and resources, nurturing a sense of 
ownership (Bardhan, 2002). However, as Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000, 2005) show 
theoretically, such initiatives may be vulnerable to capture by local elites. Whether such 
initiatives improve the welfare of disadvantaged people thus becomes an empirical question. 
According to the results of the survey by Mansuri and Rao (2004), empirical evidence on 
whether community-based initiatives improve targeting and reduce poverty is mixed but tends 
to be positive within an enabling institutional environment. At the same time, Mansuri and Rao 
(2004) point out the difficulties inherent in establishing causality. 
In South Asia today, where programs that advance community roles were being 
implemented as early as in the 1940s (Binswanger-Mkhize et al., 2010), community-based 
development activities aimed at fighting persistent poverty are commonly found. However, 
Pakistan, which is also located in South Asia, is lagging behind in this aspect, and economic as 
well as human development in Pakistan requires a massive effort for improvement. Successive 
regimes in Pakistan, both democratic and non-democratic, have lacked the capacity and political 
will to extend basic amenities to its inhabitants. Since the 1970s, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) have entered to fill the gaps in sectors where the government lacks either 
the capacity or political will for improvement, but not much success has been seen from them. It 
may be speculated that underlying this situation is a society with an unequal distribution of 
income and assets, where the core network is based on familial, clan, and tribal relations; it may 
also have limited historical experience in cooperation with regard to community-based 
organizations (CBOs) in development efforts (Kurosaki, 2006). Nevertheless, microeconomic 
research on community-based development activities in Pakistan has been limited, save for a 
few studies (e.g., Khwaja, 2001; Kurosaki, 2005; Cheema et al., 2006). 
To help fill this gap in the literature, this paper attempts to assess the effectiveness of 
community-based development activities undertaken by an NGO in Pakistan that aims at 
reducing poverty. More specifically, the objective of this paper is to characterize the participants 
of the NGO activities, using descriptive tools. The NGO we study works in disaster-prone areas. 










   









CBOs (known as community organizations [COs] in the study area). These characteristics make 
this study especially informative in understanding the role of community-based initiatives in 
undertaking poverty reduction. In the analysis, on the one hand, villages with COs are compared 
with villages without COs; on the other, households that are CO members are compared with 
those that are not, in both types of villages. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Following this introductory section, 
Section 2 describes the study area and survey design. Section 3 provides the results of the 
descriptive analysis, in terms of village-level, CO-level, and household-level analyses. Section 4 
provides a summary and conclusion. 
2. Study Area and Survey Design 
2.1 Background of the Study Area 
Pakistan suffers from underdevelopment in terms of both economics and human 
development. For example, UNDP (2010) ranks Pakistan as the 125th of 169 countries in its 
Human Development Index, with mean years of schooling at only 4.9 years and per-capita gross 
national income at $2,678 (in purchasing power parity [PPP] dollars of 2008). Of the total 
population of Pakistan (estimated at 173.5 million in mid-2010), approximately one-quarter was 
estimated to live below the poverty line in the mid-2000s, but the poverty incidence was 
expected to have risen in the 2008–2010 period, owing to rising international grain prices and 
the devastating floods of 2010 (GOP, 2011). Most of its poor population has no access to 
efficient sources of credit (World Bank, 2002). 
Given the Pakistani government’s failure to deliver basic services to its poor, NGOs 
have been serving this disadvantaged segment of the population (ADB, 1999). NGOs in 
Pakistan can be traced back to 1947, when the country achieved independence from the United 
Kingdom. These early NGOs had a limited scope, that is, assisting those who had migrated from 
India. During the 1970s and 1980s, there was rapid growth in the number of NGOs in Pakistan; 
the major reason behind this mushrooming growth was an inflow of generous international 
funding, as a reward for allying itself with the United States and its allies. During this period, 
some of the NGOs played a vital role in creating awareness among the general public regarding 
social issues such as basic human rights, developing the roles of women, and overpopulation, 
while others provided basic amenities and essential services in remote areas of the country. 
During the 1990s, the services offered by NGOs expanded to include basic health and 
education services; the provision of training for income-earning skills; awareness campaigns; 
the provision of community-managed water and sanitation services, through microinfrastructure 
projects (MIPs); credit access to the otherwise unbankable, through microfinance (MF) 










   
 
   
 
 
                                                  
     
         
 
     
 
     
 
     
























activities, NGOs in Pakistan also began to place more emphasis on community-based programs. 
At the same time, the government of Pakistan also sought to increase the role of communities in 
development. For instance, under the military regime led by General Pervez Musharraf, who 
was in power from 1999 to 2008, devolution policies were introduced, whereby the role of local 
governments was enhanced and a new scheme of community-based development called the 
Citizen Community Board (CCB) was introduced (Kurosaki, 1995; 1996). Several Pakistani 
NGOs with previous experience in community-based development were involved in running the 
CCB schemes under the Musharraf regime. Nevertheless, with respect to Pakistan in particular, 
rigorous economic research on the impact of such NGOs and the conditions underlying their 
success or failure is lacking. 
2.2 The NGO 
For empirical analysis in this paper, we selected an NGO called the Pakistani 
Hoslamand Khawateen Network (PHKN). Established on June 10, 2000, and led by Mrs. Irum 
Fatima (current president), PHKN has its headquarters in District Haripur of Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa (KPK),
1  and it serves the surrounding areas. PHKN’s first community-based 
intervention was implemented in 2000 in a small village called Pind Hashim Khan of District 
Haripur. At that time, PHKN was known as the Pind Hashim Khan Network. The network was 
composed of a small group of women with the shared goal of uplifting the lives of their fellow 
women, both socially and economically. With funding from international as well as domestic 
donors, PHKN has grown rapidly since then and now operates in several districts. 
2 
Nevertheless, its main activities are focused in District Haripur. 
The total area of District Haripur is 1,725 km
2. According to the 1998 Census,
3 the 
total population of the district was 692,228, the average annual population growth rate was 
2.2%, and the district’s population density was 400 persons/km
2.
4  According to the same census, 
the literacy rate for the district was 53.7% (70.5% for males vs. 37.4% for females), and 
approximately 76% of the housing units had electricity service. The dwellers of the district have 
poor access to basic civic facilities and amenities. 
1  District is a basic unit of local administration under a province in Pakistan, which is a federation state
 
composed of four provinces. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) is one of the four provinces, formerly known
 
as the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). In April 2010, the constitution of Pakistan was amended 

and the former NWFP was renamed Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. 

2  At the time of our survey, PHKN had its activities in Districts Haripur, Abbotabad, Mansehra, Kohistan, 





3  This is the most recent population census in Pakistan; the next census is being carried out in 2011. 

4  According to KPK authorities, the population of the district in 2010 was estimated to be 1,265,799. 

This figure was culled from the KPK’s official website (http://www.khyberpakhtunkhwa.gov.pk/aboutus/ 




















   
 
 
                                                  
 
 










According to a government source,
5  more than 30% of the district’s population lives 
below the poverty line. Like the rest of the country, women’s participation in the labor market is 
low, owing to low investment in human capital, negative social biases and prejudices, 
controversial and discriminatory policies and laws, restrictions on female mobility, and the 
internalization of patriarchy by women themselves.
6  Almost two-thirds of the district area is 
rain-fed, and the district is prone to natural as well as manmade calamities. The last few decades 
have witnessed serious ecological degradation due to illegal timber-harvesting, deforestation on 
mountains and hillsides, rangeland degradation, over-cultivation, uncontrolled grazing, low 
productivity in agriculture and livestock, poor water resource management, and the like. This 
degradation has resulted in frequent flash floods, landslides, and attacks by wild boars, affecting 
the lives of hundreds of those living in the district. 
Working in such a difficult region, PHKN appears to be praiseworthy for its focus on 
women and community-based interventions. However, as emphasized in the introduction, such 
interventions may be vulnerable to capture by local elites; especially considering the social 
background of these women who lead the NGO, there is a high likelihood of such a capture. 
Therefore, it is of great interest to examine empirically whether PHKN’s initiatives have 
improved the welfare of disadvantaged people. In geographical areas served by PHKN, PHKN 
is by far the dominant NGO. For this reason, we can safely attribute our empirical findings 
solely to PHKN. 
2.3 The Process of Community-Based Development 
PHKN adopts a community-based development approach, under which dwellers of a 
village or rural community are organized into CBOs. In the case of PHKN, such CBOs are 
called COs. COs are organized before any kind of intervention takes place in a village or rural 
community. Owing to social and cultural constraints, there are separate COs for males and 
females. In a small village, one female CO and one male CO are established, at most; in a large 
village, there may be several female (male) COs, but each CO usually covers one or a few 
Mohallas (geographical units within a village), each of which is distinct from other Mohallas 
covered by COs in the same village. Each CO has 16–40 members. An important feature of 
PHKN is that almost three-quarters of its COs are run by women, which is significant in the 
context of the male-dominated society of Pakistan. 
A typical PHKN intervention has the following steps. First, PHKN makes its initial 
contact with a village in a meeting with peer leaders (e.g., village elders, school teachers, local 




6  Cited from http://www.statemaster.com/encyclopedia/Haripur-District and http://www.sungi.org/
 



















   
 
elected members, and religious leaders). Contact is made at the same time an initial assessment 
of the area is done, during which general information on the village society and on its 
development needs is collected. The introduction of PHKN to a village can be made through 
one of three routes. First, PHKN staff members find potential villages from available secondary 
information. Second, the concerned local administration (e.g., social welfare, agriculture, health, 
education, and livestock departments) or local politicians may ask for a PHKN contact. Third, 
the peer leaders of a village may ask PHKN for an initial contact. The first route is employed 
most frequently. 
After the initial contact, PHKN holds a series of meetings with peer leaders, local 
communities, and stakeholders. This stage is called the 1st Dialogue, and it is recorded in the 
PHKN log books. Subject to satisfying the minimum criteria qualification and eliciting the 
willingness of a considerable number of villagers, a CO is formed. This stage is called the 2nd 
Dialogue. During the 2nd Dialogue, community development tools such as participatory rapid 
appraisal (PRA) and village resource mapping are employed to identify developmental needs 
and priorities, and CO office bearers (the president, secretary, and activists) are elected and 
trained on how to run a CO (i.e., record-keeping, accounting, and savings management). All 
interventions (such as provision of MF, human resource development [HRD] trainings, MIPs, 
etc.) undertaken by PHKN are categorized as the 3rd Dialogue. 
After COs are established in this way and registered by PHKN, they begin to perform 
routine activities. Usually, COs have a monthly meeting called the general body meeting (GBM), 
where CO members discuss PHKN activities, prevailing issues in the village, and future plans to 
address issues. CO members also deposit savings during these meetings. CO savings are 
recorded in individual savings accounts. Besides the training mentioned above, all COs are 
provided with HRD training, the emphasis of which is on the development of income-earning 
skills and microenterprise management; the exact human resource training received differs from 
CO to CO, reflecting each community’s unique needs. In villages with deficits in educational 
institutions, PHKN sometimes provides assistance to community-based schools. Similarly, in 
villages with poor health facilities, PHKN may train and mobilize informal health workers, such 
as traditional birth attendants (TBAs). PHKN staff members regularly visit each CO, with the 
average visit frequency being once every two months. During these visits, PHKN personnel 
discuss various issues with CO members while also checking CO records. 
Two major interventions by PHKN that involve large amounts of money are MF and 
MIPs. When an MIP is sanctioned at a CO’s request, the CO needs to contribute around 20% of 
the total cost. When a CO requests an MF or MIP, PHKN considers the amount of total savings 
from CO members as an efficiency parameter in deciding whether or not to advance an MF 
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and/or sanction an MIP.
7  CO savings are sometimes used to finance CO members’ due 
contributions in running MIPs. With the consent of the majority of CO members, CO savings 
can also be used in internal lending, to assist a CO member who faces financial difficulties; by 
the time our survey had been executed, however, such internal lending had yet to happen. 
As this description of intervention steps shows, the link between PHKN personnel and 
village peer leaders, as well as that between the peer leaders and general villagers, play a key 
role in PHKN interventions. These characteristics suggest the potential for elite capture, making 
our investigation an interesting case study. 
2.4 Survey Design 
Given the aforementioned PHKN intervention steps, we adopted a three-tier survey 
strategy to collect objective data, at the village, CO, and household levels. For the village and 
CO surveys, we attempted a census survey, while for the household survey, we adopted a 
random sampling design. Structured questionnaires in Urdu were prepared after pretests and 
were subsequently used for data collection. The questionnaires consisted of various open- and 
close-ended questions. The survey was implemented in two phases covering the project area of 
PHKN − the first phase (September–October 2010) for the village and CO survey, and the 
second phase (November–December 2010) for the household survey. 
In the village survey, knowledgeable persons such as the elected members (councilors) 
of union councils, schoolteachers, and lady health workers were interviewed. The survey 
attempted to cover all villages that were (potential) target areas of PHKN. Most of PHKN 
interventions are in District Haripur, and so we attempted to survey all 101 villages in that 
district. However, for administrative reasons, we were not able to obtain valid information from 
two villages. In addition, since PHKN activities target several neighboring villages, two villages 
in District Mansehra and four villages in District Abbotabad were also surveyed. Therefore, we 
gathered 105 observations of villages, of which 99 are located in District Haripur. 
In the CO survey, presidents and/or secretaries of the COs were interviewed, with 
cross-checking with log books and administrative records maintained by PHKN. We 
successfully collected information from all 90 COs registered with PHKN. All 90 COs were 
located in District Haripur. 
In the household survey, two types of households were randomly chosen: those who 
have been members of PHKN activities and those who have not yet been involved therein. The 
first category contains “treatment” households, denoted by T below. The second category 
contains “control” households. Two types of control households are assumed: Control 1 (C1), 
7  On the other hand, where there is a dire need, the need consideration may override the allocation 
principle, based on the CO savings. We observed a few cases where a CO with a poor savings record but 





   
   
 
 
   
 








   
 
composed of non-member households in CO villages; and Control 2 (C2), composed of those 
who live in non-CO villages. 
Regarding type-T households, in the first stage of sampling, 50 sample COs of the 90 
were chosen, and in the second stage of sampling, we attempted to collect information on 
five-member households, randomly chosen from the member list. We successfully surveyed 
five-member households, except for one CO where we surveyed four members. Therefore, our 
sample size of T households is 249. 
To collect information on type-C1 households, we surveyed non-member households 
living in the village (or Mohalla, if there were two or more COs in the village) where T 
households were surveyed. The sample for C1  households was randomly selected from the 
electoral list of the villagers, at the rate of one per one type-T household. In two villages with 
three COs (with two COs in one village and one CO in other), no control households were 
surveyed, since the majority of households in the villages were already CO members. In other 
cases, five non-member households were surveyed in each village (or each Mohalla, when the 
village was large and had several COs), except for one case where four non-member households 
were surveyed. This resulted in a random sample of 234 type-C1 households. 
Regarding type-C2 households, we randomly selected five households from 20 villages 
that had no COs; these 20 villages were randomly selected from the village list. The sample of 
households was randomly selected from the electoral list of villagers. Thus, the sample size of 
C2 households is 100. 
3. Descriptive Analysis 
3.1 Comparison of CO Villages and Non-CO Villages 
3.1.1 Empirical strategy 
In the village survey, we collected more than 200 variables that characterize a village. 
Using this dataset, this subsection compares the (unconditional or conditional) mean of several 
variables among villages with a CO of PHKN (“CO villages”) and villages without (“non-CO 
villages”). 
When the variable of concern is predetermined at the time of PHKN intervention, the 
difference can be attributed to the selection into PHKN treatment. Conceptually, the selection 
effect is a mixture of the targeting by PHKN towards villages (endogenous placement) and the 
response of villages to PHKN in the form of CO formation (self-selection). The dataset, 
however, limits our ability to rigorously identify either the endogenous placement effect or the 
self-selection effect. Therefore, our focus is on quantifying the net effect of the two; we will 
interpret loosely that the targeting is towards the poor if CO villages are poorer than non-CO 










   
 
 
   
   
 
   
 
   
 
 
matters, on a practical basis, in assessing the success of targeting is the net result. In addition, 
considering the PHKN’s process of community mobilization described in subsection 2.3, by 
altering the definition of “CO villages” and “non-CO villages” (explained below), we can shed 
light on which of the two (i.e., PHKN’s placement vs. villages’ self-selection) is likely to be 
more important. 
When the variable of concern is potentially endogenous to PHKN intervention, the 
difference can be attributed to the selection into PHKN treatment (both endogenous placement 
and self-selection) and the causal impact of PHKN treatment on village-level indices. Since our 
survey is not designed as a randomized controlled experiment and no event could be safely 
considered a natural experiment for the PHKN treatment variation, it is not possible to identify 
behavioral impacts from the selection effects. In this paper, we are interested solely in 
quantifying the net effect. 
3.1.2 Classification of villages 
Of the 105 village observations, 99 are in District Haripur; the rest are in Abbotabad or 
Mansehra. One concern could be that the six villages in Abbotabad or Mansehra are different 
from the 99 villages in Haripur, in terms of some unobservable factors. To address this concern, 
when conducting the bivariate comparison of villages with CO and non-CO villages, we use the 
full sample as well as the Haripur subsample for the robustness check; in conducting the 
multivariate regressions, we include dummy variables for Abbotabad and Mansehra. 
With regard to definitions of CO vs. non-CO villages, our default definition is based 
on the PHKN list of villages with a CO or similar activities. The list includes those villages 
currently lacking registered COs. We check the robustness with respect to the exclusion of such 
villages from the category of CO villages (a narrower definition of “CO villages”). We use the 
first definition as the default, since we expect this categorization to capture better the essence of 
PHKN targeting. As another measure, we can expand the category of CO villages by adding 
those villages that were contacted by PHKN but failed to form a CO and are not listed in the 
PHKN list of villages with a CO or similar activities (a wider definition of “CO villages”). To 
characterize pure placement by PHKN, this measure may be better than the default definition. 
Therefore, we will use the wider definition as another robustness check. 
If our sample size were larger, we could compare four types of villages directly: those 
villages contacted by PHKN but failed to form a CO, those villages listed in the PHKN list of 
villages with a CO or similar activities but currently lacking a registered CO, those villages with 
currently registered COs, and the rest. However, since the sample size is small (i.e., each 
category with 20, 16, 24, and 45 observations), we adopt the dichotomous classifications with 



















                                                  
         
 
   
   
 
and 60 (=20 + 16 + 24) as the wider definition (see the first rows of Table 1). 
3.1.3 Comparison of CO and non-CO villages 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for all 105 villages. When there was no variation 
across villages—as was the case with some variables—such variables are not included in the 
tables, but some of them are mentioned in the text below. The size of the villages in terms of 
population
8  ranges from 140 to 8,245. More than 50% of the villagers cite agriculture as their 
main occupation, followed by various services accounting for approximately 20%. The 
occupational structure thus conforms with nationwide occupational compositions. Furthermore, 
the occupation structure has variation across villages—for example, the share of agriculture 
ranges from 0% to 92% and its standard deviation is 22 percentage points. The average literacy 
rate among the villages is 54%, which also conforms with provincial or national-level averages. 
Literacy rates also vary across villages, in the range of 5–95%. Of the 105 villages, only 28% 
are connected to irrigation canals; the rest are rain-fed, implying their agricultural production 
may suffer from rainfall fluctuations if tubewell irrigation is not adequate. 
<Bivariate comparison> 
In Table 2, we report the means of key variables, separately for CO villages and 
non-CO villages, with statistical tests for the equality of means. To check the robustness of the 
comparison, we use two sets for non-CO villages: 65 non-CO villages, regardless of district, and 
59 non-CO villages in Haripur District. As shown in Table 2, the exclusion of non-CO villages 
from the Abbotabad and Mansehra villages slightly weakens the contrast between CO and 
non-CO villages. Appendix Table 1 shows the contrast based on the narrower or wider definition 
of CO villages. In what follows, the robust, significant contrast is discussed. 
Among demographic factors, CO villages tend to have lower adult literacy rates (i.e., 
by around 10 percentage points) than non-CO villages. Village sizes were all similar. The 
occupational structure in non-CO villages tended to be more diversified, suggesting a higher 
living standard, but the difference is significant only when we include villages in Abbotabad and 
Mansehra. 
Access to basic amenities like clean drinking water and market-access roads is similar 
between the two sets of villages, while a clear distinction between CO and non-CO villages is 
found with respect to the availability of natural gas, cable TV, and internet connections. Non-CO 
8  This information was obtained from the office of union councils. A union council is the smallest unit of 
local governance, and each covers 10–25 villages. It consists of elected representatives from 
constituencies spread across the union council. Besides legislative functions, union councils are 
responsible for local developmental work and the maintenance of records of basic socio-economic 






   










                                                  
 
 
     
       
villages have much better to access to these facilities, which are generally considered amenities 
available only in economically better-off areas. Although the statistical significance level was 
not very high, non-CO villages tend to have more grocery shops called Karyana shops, and fruit 
shops. This is also an indication that COs are more likely to be formed in under-developed 
villages. 
Access to basic health facilities shows that the two types of villages are similar in 
terms of formal basic health facilities. The better access to informal basic health 
facilities—namely, trained TBAs—could be attributable to efforts by PHKN to improve access. 
We found a similar pattern with regard to education facilities. As far as formal education is 
concerned, there is no significant difference between CO and non-CO villages; with regard to 
informal education (community-based schools), however, CO villages have more facilities than 
non-CO villages. 
As an indicator of local governance, we collected information on existing 
dispute-settlement forums (DSFs); the majority of villages have some kind of DSF. There is no 
difference between CO and non-CO villages with respect to the existence of a traditional DSF 
called a Jirga (a council of local elders). On the other hand, the prevalence of non-traditional or 
parallel DSFs is significantly higher in CO villages than in non-CO villages; this finding 
appears to suggest the facilitating role of PHKN. 
Finally, considering the huge shock to Pakistan when inflicted with unprecedented 
flooding in July–August 2010,
9  we collected information on the susceptibility of villages with 
respect to natural disasters. The incidence of flood damage was higher among CO villages than 
in non-CO villages. This suggests that PHKN targets villages that are more prone to natural 
disasters. 
As shown in Appendix Table 1, the use of the wider definition of “CO villages” does 
not alter the results qualitatively. This can be interpreted as suggestive evidence that a major 
component of the net correlation between village characteristics and PHKN interventions is the 
placement effect (i.e., pure targeting by PHKN), rather than village self-selection in forming a 
CO. 
<Multivariate comparison> 
A bivariate comparison of CO and non-CO villages thus shows that PHKN targets 
poorer villages in the sense of lower adult literacy rates and low availability of natural gas, cable 
TV, and internet services. PHKN also targets villages that are more prone to natural disasters. 
9  In July–August 2010, Pakistan experienced “the worst floods in its history.... The floods have affected 
84 districts out of a total 121 districts in Pakistan, and more than 20 million people—one-tenth of 
Pakistan's population.... More than 1,700 men, women and children have lost their lives, and at least 1.8 





















   
 
 
                                                  
     
 
 
On the other hand, CO villages seem to enjoy better access to community-based schools, TBAs, 
and non-traditional DSFs. Our field observations suggest that this pattern indicates the positive 
impact of PHKN, rather than mistargeting. 
To examine the difference between CO and non-CO villages from a slightly different 
angle, multivariate comparison is attempted; our econometric model is not intended for causal 
analysis but for descriptive purposes. Therefore, we adopt a simple linear probability model 
with the CO-village dummy as the dependent variable and the selected variables in Table 2 as 
explanatory variables.
10  Because of the small sample size and inherent multicollinearity 
problems, we reduce the number of explanatory variables by excluding some variables that are 
associated with there being no difference in the bivariate comparison. 
The regression results are reported in Table 3 and Appendix Tables 2–3. Model 1 uses 
variables that, from PHKN’s viewpoint, are safely regarded as predetermined, so that we can 
discuss the selection effect only. Models 2–5 include potentially endogenous variables that 
might capture the behavioral impact of PHKN. The potentially endogenous variables include dsf 
(non-traditional DSFs), cbsch (availability of community-based schools), and tba (availability 
of TBAs). All three of these activities are promoted by PHKN. 
The 15 specifications in the three tables robustly support the bivariate results that 
PHKN targets poorer and more vulnerable villages. However, the statistical significance level 
varies from that suggested in the bivariate results. Strikingly, once controlling for other factors, 
literacy rates have no statistically significant effect on the presence of a CO. For other 
variables—like the availability of natural gas, internet access and grocery shops, and disaster 
susceptibility—the pro-poor targeting pattern remains intact and statistically significant in 
several (but not all) specifications. In this sense, support from the multiple regression for 
pro-poor targeting is slightly weaker than that suggested in the bivariate analysis. 
One variable that becomes significant at this point is the length of the road connecting 
the village to a major market (rd_length). It has a significantly negative coefficient, implying 
that CO villages tend to be closer to a market than non-CO villages, after controlling for other 
factors. This finding can be interpreted as evidence of cost minimization behavior by PHKN, 
rather than evidence of mistargeting. 
When each of the three potentially endogenous variables (dsf, cbsch, and tba) is added 
to the regression model, it has a positive and statistically significant effect, suggesting that the 
bivariate comparison results are robust to controlling for other variables. Judging from 
observations in the field, we interpret this as suggestive of the causal impact of PHKN 
interventions, rather than mistargeting. Given the data limitation, rigorous evidence for this 
10  The probit results are very similar to those reported in this paper. To be consistent with the following 
tables, we report results based on the linear probability model. 
12 
 
   
 
 




















claim remains to be seen and is left for further research. The addition of these potentially 
endogenous variables does not qualitatively affect the coefficients on more predetermined 
variables (i.e., compare Model 1 with Models 2–5). 
In summary, the above results demonstrate a tendency for a village to form a CO if the 
village is near an urban area, lacks amenities associated with better-off areas, and is prone to 
natural disasters. Therefore, we can conclude that PHKN targets the poor, on the whole. 
3.2 NGO Interventions at the CO Level 
3.2.1 Empirical strategy 
The 90 COs in our dataset are not homogeneous, in terms of either their structure or 
their performance. Of about 150 variables we collected for each CO, Table 4 reports the 
summary statistics of the major variables in two broad categories: those characteristics that were 
fixed at the time of CO formation and those that represent the performance of collective action 
following CO formation. We are interested in identifying what characteristic is associated with 
more successful collective action by a CO. 
Therefore, we first discuss the summary statistics of these two groups of variables, for 
the entire 90-CO sample; this discussion is followed by a comparison of male and female COs. 
We then regress some of the second group of CO variables (i.e., CO performance indicators) on 
village characteristics and the first group of CO variables. Finally, since the CO performance 
indicators are mutually dependent, we look at the bivariate correlations among them. Ideally, if 
we have instrumental variables (IVs) that affect one of these CO performance indicators without 
affecting the others, we can cleanly identify the impact of that endogenous variable on other 
endogenous variables. However, we are not able to find such an IV in our dataset. Instead, we 
look at the net correlation to shed light on the interrelations among the performance indicators, 
first by using the observed values and then by using the regression residuals, after controlling 
for observable characteristics. 
3.2.2 Characteristics of COs 
As shown in Table 4, the average membership of a CO is 23 persons (range, 16–40). 
Male COs account for 26% of all COs; the rest are female. It takes on average 50 days for 
villagers to form a CO after the initial contact with PHKN (the variable named incub_per in the 
table). The incubation period ranges from one day to 398 days (about 13 months). As shown 
with the variable named co_age, some of the COs are very old, dating back to the days before 
the formal establishment of PHKN. The average CO age is 45 months. 
We collected detailed information regarding CO leadership, that is, president, secretary, 





   
 
 
   
 
 






                                                  
       
   
     











The average ages of the secretary and the activist are 34 and 36 years, while their average 
schooling years were seven and six years, respectively. The ages of the president and secretary 
highly correlate (correlation coefficients are 0.486, statistically significant at the 1% level), and 
as do the education of the president and the secretary (correlation coefficients 0.458, significant 
at the 1% level). On the other hand, the age and education of activists do not correlate with 
those of presidents/secretaries. Therefore, in the CO-level regression analysis below, we 
combine the age (education) of the president and the secretary by using their respective mean 
values. 
PHKN activities are classified into three broad types
11; some of their characteristics 
are shown in Table 4. The first type of activities is savings. As shown in Table 4, the average 
amount of savings among COs is in excess of Rs. 7,800, while the average per-capita savings is 
over Rs. 350.
12  The second type of activities includes the implementation of MF and MIPs. 
Both of these are important, since they involve a large amount of PHKN resources and CO 
collective action. In all, 27% of COs have availed themselves of MF credit thus far (Table 4). 
Credit is given to individual members, with the average loan size being over Rs.  6,500. 
Approximately 36% of COs benefitted from an MIP, with the average number of completed 
projects at 0.4 (Table 4). The size of these MIPs ranges from Rs. 175,000 to Rs. 855,000, with 
its mean at Rs. 500,000. One of the popular MIP fields is water/sanitation. When an MIP is 
implemented in a village, not only CO members but also non-members benefit from the project. 
It is estimated that the number of non-member beneficiary households are almost double the 
number of beneficiary member households. The third type of PHKN activity is HRD training. If 
we pool all kinds of HRD training, it becomes clear that all COs have received such training. On 
average, six training sessions are provided per CO. In Table 4, we distinguish three types of 
HRD training: leadership and managerial skill development training, non-conventional HRD 
training, and natural disaster management training. The average expenditure per CO for HRD 
training is in excess of Rs. 300,000. 
In Table 5, male and female COs are compared on the basis of these variables. As 
shown in the table, the number of male COs tends to be larger than that of female COs, by two 
persons; the difference is statistically significant. There is no statistically significant difference 
in the length of the incubation period, while male COs tend to be more recently established than 
female COs. Male CO leaders tend to be older and more educated than female CO leaders. The 
education gap may simply reflect the general gender gap in education in the region. 
11  In addition to these three, DSFs are important CO activities facilitated by PHKN. Common social
 
forums for each CO were surveyed in detail, including mosques, Bethak (a traditional guesthouse), Hujra
 
(a traditional place of socialization used by men), etc. Some variation also exists in the use of local DSFs.
 
The quantitative analysis of these CO performance indicators is left for future analysis. 












   
 






                                                  
         
     
       
 
Looking at CO performance, there is no statistically significant difference in the level 
of savings, either total or per capita. MF has not been extended to male COs, and MIPs are also 
concentrated among female COs. The absolute number of conventional training sessions is the 
same for male and female COs (not reported in the table). A large number of female COs 
received HRD training on poultry farms, in nursery-plant raising, to educate and mobilize TBAs, 
in agro-based cottage industries, and with respect to income-earning skills. For female COs, 
PHKN also provides HRD training on family planning. The overall patterns thus vividly show 
PHKN’s orientation towards women. 
3.2.3 Correlates of CO savings, microfinance, and micro-infrastructure projects 
Does the gender contrast found in the bivariate comparison hold even when we control 
for other factors? Under this motivation, we run CO-level regression models. Such models are 
expected to clarify the correlates associated with the implementation of MF and MIPs on the 
one hand and the level of CO savings on the other. The explanatory variables we use are some 
of the village characteristics used in Table 3, as well as certain predetermined CO characteristics 
such as the number of CO members, incubation period, CO’s age, and CO leadership’s human 
capital. 
Table 6 presents the estimation results.
13  Regarding the determinants of CO savings 
per capita, the village-level variable for the availability of clean drinking water has a positive 
and significant coefficient (Model 1, saving_pc), suggesting that savings are higher in COs 
located in villages that have better health facilities. However, the coefficient becomes 
statistically insignificant once CO-level explanatory variables are added (Model 2, saving_pc). 
Savings are more concentrated in COs with a smaller number of members (probably because 
members do not feel the social pressure to save regularly, if a CO has many members), with a 
longer incubation period (we do not have a clear interpretation for this finding), and with elderly 
and educated leaders (suggesting higher enforcement of saving practices within the CO). There 
is no significant difference between male and female COs, as is the case with the bivariate 
comparison.  
With respect to project implementation, there is an interesting contrast regarding 
village demographics. While the literacy rate has no significant effect on the implementation of 
MF, the variable has a positive and significant effect on the implementation of an MIP. If the 
literacy rate were to increase by 1%, then the probability of having an MIP is predicted to 
13  When the dependent variable is either mf or mip, we estimate a linear probability model with a dummy 
variable as the dependent variable. As an alternative specification, we attempt probit models as well. 
However, probit results in this case are highly unstable, probably due to the small-sample bias. For this 





















                                                  
     
 
increase by about 1%.
14  This positive relationship with the literacy rate may imply that the 
implementation of an MIP requires villagers who have a good education. Furthermore, the 
village’s proportion of population in agriculture (agri_prof_prc) has a positive effect on MF, but 
not on MIP. Moreover, the coefficients on the road length to a major city (rd_length) show no 
statistically significant effect on MF, but a negative and significant effect on MIP. In general, 
traditional MF credit—such as that provided by Bangladesh’s Grameen Bank—is used to 
establish small businesses like rice husking and bamboo weaving, which are market-oriented. 
However, in the context of our survey area, our results for agri_prof_prc and rd_length appear 
to suggest that the purpose of MF projects might not have been for starting a small business. 
Rather, the credit may have been used to smooth consumption vis-à-vis seasonal income 
fluctuations. Finally, we interpret the negative coefficients of road length in the MIP regression 
as a reflection of cost minimization, from PHKN’s viewpoint. 
The effects of CO-level variables on MF or MIP dummies also show an interesting 
contrast. Both MF and MIP probabilities are lower among COs with more members and 
younger COs, but this is statistically significant only with respect to MIP probability. This could 
be due to the hurdle of the 20% contribution of CO members in implementing MIPs. Among 
COs with many members or those established very recently, it is more difficult for CO members 
to agree with the implementation of an MIP that incurs a substantial cost among members. The 
leaders’ human capital has a positive and statistically significant effect on MF only. This may 
suggest that CO members’ demand for credit increases when the CO is led by experienced 
leaders; alternatively, it may simply reflect PHKN’s screening process, wherein the NGO 
allocates MF only to those COs managed by experienced leaders. 
3.2.4 Interrelations among CO savings, microfinance, and micro-infrastructure projects 
In screening applications from COs requesting MF or an MIP, PHKN uses the 
information pertaining to CO savings (see subsection 2.3). This screening process automatically 
implies the positive effect of saving_pc on the probability of receiving MF or an MIP. On the 
other hand, saving_pc is endogenously determined by CO members, implying that an ordinary 
least squares (OLS) model for MF or MIP that extends the model in Table 6 with saving_pc as 
an additional explanatory variable cannot provide an unbiased estimate of causal effect. 
Given this difficulty, we simply examine the bivariate relation among saving_pc, MF, 
and MIP. The top-left portion of Table 7 shows that the three correlate highly; all three 
correlation coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level. This positive correlation is a 
mixture of effects due to the screening process, observable characteristics that affect the three 
14  Note that the linear probability model gives good estimates of the partial effects on the probability of 




   
   



















variables in the same direction, and unobservable characteristics that affect the three variables in 
the same direction. As an indicator of the strength of the correlation, the bottom-left portion of 
Table 7 shows the bivariate regression coefficient in determining the probability of MF or MIP. 
The coefficient shows that if per-capita CO savings were to increase by Rs. 100, the probability 
of the CO receiving MF would increase by 9.6 percentage points, while the probability of 
receiving an MIP would increase by 8.3 percentage points. Thus, the correlation is very strong. 
To exclude from this correlation effects due to observable characteristics that affect the 
three variables in the same direction, we use the fitted residuals of saving_pc, MF, and MIP, 
from the regression results reported in Table 6 (Model 2 specification). The top-right portion of 
Table 7 shows that, at this point, the correlation coefficients between MF and MIP have become 
smaller and statistically insignificant. The insignificant correlation between the MF and MIP 
residuals implies that most of the observed correlation was due to the effects of observable 
characteristics that affect MF and MIP dummies in the same direction. 
Although the statistical significance level diminishes, the correlation between 
saving_pc and MF and that between saving_pc and MIP remain significantly positive. As shown 
in the bottom-right portion of Table 7, if per-capita CO savings were to increase by Rs. 100, the 
probability of a CO receiving MF would increase by 5.1 percentage points, while that of 
receiving an MIP would increase by 3.8 percentage points. Clearly, the magnitudes are still large. 
Although we cannot deny the possibility that this remaining correlation was due to 
unobservables that affect the three variables in the same direction, it is likely that the correlation 
reflects PHKN’s screening process. 
In summary, the above results demonstrate that COs that perform well in one aspect 
tend also to perform well in other aspects, and that PHKN rewards such COs through the 
allocation of MF or MIPs. If such unobservables that are associated positively with performance 
take larger values among poorer households, then the process is pro-poor, reinforcing the 
assertion that PHKN’s targeting is pro-poor. Unobservable factors like the motivation to move 
out of poverty may fit with this story. On the other hand, unobservable factors like 
entrepreneurship may contradict the story (because non-poor households tend to perform better 
in CO activities, under such a scenario), making the process anti-poor and thus weakening the 
assertion that PHKN’s targeting is pro-poor. With the current dataset, we are not able to 
distinguish the two, leaving the analysis for future research. 
3.3 How Different Are CO Households from Non-CO Households? 
3.3.1 Empirical strategy 
In the household survey, we collected more than 500 variables that characterize each 




















such as age, sex, relation to the household head, work status, education status, and health status, 
and covers 3,600 individuals. We use this information to compare welfare indicators of CO and 
non-CO households in this subsection. Similar to our empirical strategy in the village-level 
analysis, our focus is on quantifying a net effect of various factors. To interpret the net effect, 
we need to be clear about what the various factors are. 
As before, the observed difference can be attributed to the selection into PHKN 
treatment and the causal impact of treatment on households. However, the selection component 
now includes an additional factor: in addition to PHKN’s endogenous placement and villages’ 
self-selection in forming a CO, there is household-level self-selection in joining the CO, 
conditional on the successful formation of a CO in the village. 
The comparison of type-T households (CO member households) and type-C1 
households (non-member households in CO villages) gives us suggestive evidence for the net 
effect of the causal impact of treatment and the household-level self-selection. The comparison 
of type-T households and type-C2 households (households in non-CO villages) gives us 
suggestive evidence for the net effect of the causal impact of treatment, PHKN’s endogenous 
placement, village-level self-selection, and household-level self-selection. 
Therefore, if the variable of concern is clearly predetermined—so that we can ignore 
the causal impact of treatment—we can have an idea about the household-level self-selection 
effect by comparing type-T and type-C1 households. The difference between this comparison 
and the comparison of type-T and type-C2 households gives us suggestive information vis-à-vis 
effects due to village-level selection (both endogenous placement and village-level 
self-selection). By comparing these comparison results with results using variables that may be 
endogenous to PHKN interventions, the direction of the causal impact can be inferred. This is 
our empirical strategy in analyzing household and individual-level data. 
3.3.2 Household-level analysis 
<Variables of concern> 
Table 8 shows the summary statistics of household-level variables that affect the 
welfare of individuals in the household. First, in terms of demography, the average household 
contains 6.2 members; the female population therein is larger than the male population, on 
average (the mean of the female–male ratio is 1.14). Thus, our sample households are smaller in 
size than the national average (7.20) and more favorable to females (the national population 
female–male ratio is 0.93). About 9% of the sample households are headed by female heads. 
The average number of years of education among household heads is low, only 5.8 years. On 
average, 34% of households suffered from the 2010 floods, and the same percentage suffered 














   
 
 
                                                  
     
   
 
       
   
The main physical assets of the sample households are land and livestock. Both of 
them are distributed unequally across households, as shown in large standard deviations of these 
variables. The household-level usage ratios for natural gas, internet, and cable TV are much 
lower than the village-level indicator of the availability of these amenities in the village, 
implying a substantial within-village variation in the actual use of such services. House 
conditions and land ownership are safely considered exogenous to PHKN interventions, while 
livestock ownership and amenity use may be more endogenous. As measures of income 
diversification, the number of household members employed on a full-time base and the dummy 
for remittance receipts are shown in Table 8. About one-fifth of the sample households have 
access to remittance income. Parallel to the village-level analysis, we show two variables that 
proxy susceptibility to natural disasters. 
The main welfare indicator for a household is consumption.
15  The table shows five 
measures of aggregate consumption: total expenditure, food expenditure, non-food expenditure, 
total expenditure per capita, and food expenditure per adult equivalence unit. The average of 
total per-capita expenditure is Rs. 230,000, that is, US$2,670 per capita per annum. As a welfare 
indicator capturing a different aspect, we include in the table an indicator variable regarding 
women’s mobility. This is a measure of women’s empowerment, and its higher value implies 
higher welfare for women, ceteris paribus. On average, 57% of sample households replied that 
women of the household are allowed to move freely within the village, of which 20.8 
percentage points require no permission for movement. 
<Comparison of treatment and control households > 
Table 9 shows that there is no difference between type-T and C1 or between type-T and 
C2 households with respect to demographic characteristics. On the other hand, the susceptibility 
to natural disasters (both floods and wild boars) is higher among treatment households than 
among control households, and three of the four differences are statistically significant. Since 
we have no reason to expect natural disasters to occur in response to PHKN treatment, we 
interpret this finding in terms of self-selection: those households that are more vulnerable to 
natural disasters, even within the village, are more likely to join the CO. In this sense, the 
assertion that PHKN targets the environmentally vulnerable appears to hold, not only across 
villages but also within villages. 
As far as asset and consumption indicators are concerned, there is no difference 
15  Using per-capita consumption, we also calculated poverty measures. Since the poverty line for our 
survey villages is not definite, we do not report the results here. However, the contrast shown in poverty 
measures is qualitatively the same as the contrast shown in this paper using per-capita consumption. 
Poverty measures also confirm that treatment households are poorer than C2 households but not different 















   





                                                  
   
 
       
 
     
between type-T and C1  households. In sharp contrast, there is a statistically significant 
difference between type-T and C2 households in terms of these variables, and the direction of 
the difference is clear: Type-T households are poorer than type-C2 households.
16 We interpret 
these results as mainly reflecting village-level selection (both PHKN’s placement and villages’ 
self-selection); poorer villages are more likely to be under treatment, and the welfare-improving 
impact of PHKN interventions is not strong enough to mitigate the negative selection effects. 
There is an interesting contrast in two variables (zu_in and zu_out), both of which are 
associated with the Islamic practice of charity giving. Muslims are encouraged to give a fixed 
portion of their wealth (called Zakat and Ushr) to charity, generally to the poor and needy. The 
proportion of recipients is significantly higher among type-T households than among C2 
households. This suggests that treatment households live in poorer villages that are often 
recipients of Zakat. On the other hand, the proportion of Zakat givers is significantly higher 
among type-T households than among type-C1 households. This could be due to the causal 
effect of the PHKN intervention on the behavior of treatment households and/or to self-selection 
within a village (i.e., those households who have inherent attitudes in favor of charity giving are 
more likely to join the program). 
Women’s mobility (w_emp) is significantly higher among type-T households than in 
type-C1 or C2 households. Again, this could be due to the causal effect of the PHKN 
intervention on women’s empowerment and/or to self-selection (i.e., those households in which 
women are already empowered are more likely to join the program). 
To examine whether these patterns continue to hold once we control for other factors, 
we first run regressions using one of the household-level demographic variables, vulnerability, 
assets, and income shocks as the dependent variable and a selected set of these variables and 
two additional dummy variables for C1 and C2  households (the reference category type-T 
households) as explanatory variables. The results, which are available on request, mostly 
confirm the bivariate pattern. Since these household-level variables are more predetermined 
than consumption or empowerment variables, we then run regression models using three 
consumption welfare indicators (i.e., total expenditure, total expenditure per capita, and food 
expenditure per adult equivalence unit) and women’s empowerment as dependent variables, and 
household-level assets, income shocks, and two dummy variables for C1 and C2 households as 
explanatory variables. 
The regression results are reported in Table 10.
17  Household demographic and asset 
16  With regard to consumption variables and asset indicators except for radio, interpretations of Table 9 
are straightforward. With regard to the variable radio, the table shows that type-T households use radios 
much more than those of type-C2. Given the general proliferation of television and the internet, such radio 
use in the study area is a reflection of poverty. 




   
 











                                                                                                                                                  
 
 
     
         
characteristics have coefficients with the expected sign. The number of household members 
correlates positively with total expenditure, but negatively with per-capita (or per-adult 
equivalence unit) consumption; more educated households have higher consumption and higher 
women’s empowerment; remittance-receiving households enjoy higher consumption; and flood 
damage reduced consumption (although the significance level was low). 
Even after controlling for these factors, the contrast between the treatment and control 
households remain the same. Type-T households have significantly lower consumption and 
higher empowerment than type-C2  households, while type-T households, in comparison to 
type-C1 households, have similar consumption levels but higher empowerment. Considering the 
possibility that female and male COs have different characteristics, we re-estimate these 
regression models while excluding the portion of the type-T households that are associated with 
male COs. The results are reported in Appendix Table 4; they are very similar to those reported 
in Table 10. The striking difference between C1 and C2 households suggests that the net effect of 
both PHKN’s endogenous placement and villages’ self-selection is relatively large, in 
comparison to the causal impact and household selection. 
3.3.3 Individual-level analysis 
One drawback of using household-level welfare indicators, such as per-capita 
consumption, is that intra-household inequality is ignored. Using individual-level information 
pertaining to the 3,600 individuals comprising the sample households, we compare 
individual-level welfare indicators between CO households and others. 
Among adults, education and market-oriented employment are used as individual-level 
welfare indicators. The education level of an adult is safely interpreted as exogenous to PHKN 
interventions. As shown in Table 11, there is no significant difference in the education level—or, 
if there is, adults in treatment households are better educated than those in control households. 
This finding suggests that once poorer and less-educated villages are selected for PHKN 
interventions, more-educated individuals inside the village may more actively participate in CO 
activities. 
As shown in Table 11, adult females in treatment households tend to work more in line 
with market orientation. The difference is statistically significant in comparison to C1 and C2 
households.
18  Since working status is more endogenous, which may reflect the causal impact of 
PHKN activities on household behavior, we interpret this as suggestive evidence of PHKN’s 
impact on women’s empowerment. However, it is also possible that this is due to selection: 
higher mobility—we also estimated an ordered-probit model with the same explanatory variables. The 

results (available on request) are qualitatively the same as those shown in Table 10. 

18  The difference remains statistically significant in the multiple regression results, when using
 




households with adult females who were inherently oriented towards market work tend to 
become CO member households. Distinguishing the two is left to future research. 
Among children, we use school enrollment dummies for those aged between 6 and 15, 
while we use weight-for-age for those up to five years of age. Table 11 shows the comparison 
results, which distinguish girls from boys. Female infants in treatment households are slightly 
lighter than those in non-CO villages (i.e., C2 households), and this difference is significant at 
the 5% level. This may suggest the possibility that female infants tend to suffer more from 
under-nutrition those who live in treatment households. However, since children in our sample 
are overweight on average, a lighter child may imply a healthier child. When we replace the 
weight-for-age variable with the dummy variable for underweight, there was no significant 
difference among the three groups. The multiple regression results also suggest that there was 
no significant difference in weight-for-age among girls and boys in three types of households 
(Table 12). This may be due to the cancelling-out of a positive causal effect and a negative 
selection effect, or to measurement error in weighing infants. 
As shown in the middle portion of Table 11, children of primary-school age are 
properly enrolled in schools: the enrollment ratio is close to 100%, regardless of gender or 
PHKN treatment type. Looking at older children (i.e., those in middle or high school), the 
enrollment rate declines overall. Both girls and boys in treatment households enjoy higher 
enrollment ratios than children in control households; between T and C1 households, the 
difference among girls is statistically significant. The significant difference was reconfirmed in 
the multiple regression results (Table 12); this could, once again, suggest two possibilities: 
owing to the causal impact of PHKN’s promotion of schooling, girls (aged 11–15) in treatment 
households are more likely to be enrolled in schools, and/or, households that have an inherent 
preference for girls’ education tend to become CO members. Regression results excluding the 
portion of the type-T households associated with male COs are qualitatively the same as those 
reported in Table 12 (see Appendix Table 5). 
 
4. Summary and Conclusion 
In this paper, we assess what kinds of villages and households are served by 
community-based development activities, in order to infer the impact of such activities on 
poverty reduction. For this purpose, we examine the case of a female-oriented NGO in 
northwestern Pakistan. We combine descriptive analyses of villages, COs (community-based 
organizations organized by the NGO), and household-level variables. It was revealed that the 
NGO was able to target poorer villages: the participating villages are characterized by lower 
adult literacy rates, less availability of basic amenities, and higher susceptibility to natural 












With regard to household welfare indicators, we compare consumption, women’s 
empowerment, children’s school enrolment, and the weight-for-age of infants, between 
treatment households and control households. Using consumption measures, we find that CO 
member households tend to be poorer than households in non-CO villages, but that the 
difference between CO member households and non-member households in CO villages is 
insignificant. This is possibly due to a mixing of the selection effect (i.e., poorer households are 
served by the NGO) and the causal effect of interventions on poverty reduction. Using women’s 
empowerment and child enrollment measures, we find that households treated by the NGO’s 
interventions are associated with higher empowerment and higher enrollment. Based on field 
observations, the contrast appears to be evidence for the causal impact of interventions on 
poverty reduction. However, we cannot deny the possibility that this could reflect self-selection 
by treatment households vis-à-vis program participation. We are unable to find any difference in 
infant weight in terms of age, possibly owing to measurement error. 
Overall, our assessment of the NGO’s interventions is that they are well targeted 
towards the poor and are affecting change with regard to poverty reduction and women’s 
empowerment. It is left to further study to rigorously identify several routes of selection effects 
and the causal impact of interventions. Another direction of research would be an in-depth 
investigation of CO formation and changes in the local governance structure as induced by COs. 
Through such investigations—which are left to future research—we could identify factors that 
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Table 1. Summary statistics of village-level variables 
Description  Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Classification of villages 
Haripur District  d_haripur  0.943  dummy  0  1 
Abbotabad District  d_abbotabad  0.038  dummy  0  1 
Mansehra District  d_mansehra  0.019  dummy  0  1 
CO village (default definition)  d_co1  0.381  dummy  0  1 
CO village (narrower definition)  d_co2  0.229  dummy  0  1 
CO village (wider definition)  d_co3  0.571  dummy  0  1 
Demography 
Adult literacy rate (%age)  lit_rate  54.33  18.96  5  95 
Population  vil_pop  2474.95  1812.49  140  8245 
Profession (%age of total population): 
agri_prof_~c  53.29  22.49  0  92 agriculture 
Profession (%age of total population): services  services  20.09  15.51  0  80 
Profession (%age of total population): self  self_emp  7.79  8.40  0  50 
Profession (%age of total pop.): non-farm 
lab_nform  12.92  11.93  0  90 labor 
Profession (%age of total population): others  other_prof  5.91  7.11  0  40 
Basic amenities, infrastructure, and shops 
Connection to canal irrigation  irrigated_~e  0.276  dummy  0  1 
Length of the road connecting the village with  rd_length  14.98  12.44  1  50
a major market (km)
 
Clean drinking water availability (%age of
  cln_drnk_wat  74.56  31.56  0  100
total village population) 
Availability of gas connection in the village  gas  0.210  dummy  0  1 
Availability of cable TV connection  c_tv  0.267  dummy  0  1 
Availability of internet connection  i_net  0.257  dummy  0  1 
Karyana shop (grocery shop)  kar_shop  0.819  dummy  0  1 
Vegetable shop  veg_shop  0.543  dummy  0  1 
Fruit shop  frt_shop  0.390  dummy  0  1 
Existence of medical facilities in the village 
Basic Health Unit (Govt)  bhu  0.162  dummy  0  1 
Rural Health Center (Govt)  rhu  0.048  dummy  0  1 
Doctor's presence in BHU or RHC  dr_bhu_rhu  0.181  dummy  0  1 
Traditional birth attendant  tba  0.714  dummy  0  1 
Existence of education institutions in the 
Primary school (1st to 5th grades)  prim_school  0.867  dummy  0  1 
Middle school (6th to 8th grades)  mid_sch  0.352  dummy  0  1 
High school (9th to 10th grades)  hi_scho  0.219  dummy  0  1 
Community based school  cbsch  0.152  dummy  0  1 
Deni Madrassah - DM (Religious School)  d_madra  0.457  dummy  0  1 
Dispute settlement forums (DSF) 
Jirga (traditional DSF)  jirga  0.800  dummy  0  1 
Non-traditional DSF  dsf  0.829  dummy  0  1 
Locally elected representative is from the 
ler  0.705  dummy  0  1 village 
Susceptibility to natural disasters 
Village suffered flood damages in July-Aug  fld_dmg  0.876  dummy  0  1 
Note: The number of observations is 105. 
Source: Calculated by the author from the PKHS database (same for the following tables). 
25Table 2. Comparison of CO villages and non-CO villages 
Mean for each group  Difference (A)-(B)  Difference (A)-(C) 
(C) Non- (B) Non-
(A) CO  CO CO
villages  villages,  Mean  (S.E.)  Mean  (S.E.)
villages,
(n =40)  Haripur all (n =65) Variable  (n =59) 
Demography 
lit_rate  49.13  57.54  57.03  -8.41 **  (3.86)  -7.91 **  (3.90) 
vil_pop  2252.05  2612.12  2475.22  -360.07  (369.11)  -223.17  (372.95) 
agri_prof_~c  55.28  52.06  55.66  3.21  (4.36)  -0.39  (4.22) 
services  16.80  22.11  21.31  -5.31 *  (2.97)  -4.51  (2.96) 
self_emp  5.60  9.14  6.93  -3.54 **  (1.47)  -1.33  (1.08) 
lab_nform  15.10  11.58  11.58  3.52  (2.29)  3.52  (2.37) 
other_prof  7.23  5.11  4.53  2.12  (1.65)  2.70  (1.63) 
Basic amenities, infrastructure, and shops 
irrigated_~e  0.250  0.292  0.322  -0.042  (0.090)  -0.072  (0.093) 
rd_length  14.13  15.51  16.75  -1.38  (2.22)  -2.62  (2.31) 
cln_drnk_wat  71.38  76.52  76.17  -5.15  (6.64)  -4.79  (6.73) 
gas  0.025  0.323  0.254  -0.298 ***  (0.064)  -0.229 ***  (0.062) 
c_tv  0.175  0.323  0.288  -0.148 *  (0.084)  -0.113  (0.085) 
i_net  0.100  0.354  0.339  -0.254 ***  (0.077)  -0.239 ***  (0.079) 
kar_shop  0.725  0.877  0.864  -0.152 *  (0.082)  -0.139  (0.084) 
veg_shop  0.625  0.492  0.458  0.133  (0.100)  0.167  (0.101) 
frt_shop  0.325  0.431  0.390  -0.106  (0.097)  -0.065  (0.099) 
Existence of medical facilities in the village 
bhu  0.125  0.185  0.186  -0.060  (0.072)  -0.061  (0.074) 
rhu  0.025  0.062  0.051  -0.037  (0.039)  -0.026  (0.038) 
dr_bhu_rhu  0.125  0.215  0.220  -0.090  (0.074)  -0.095  (0.076) 
tba  0.825  0.646  0.644  0.179 **  (0.085)  0.181 **  (0.087) 
Existence of education institutions in the village 
prim_school  0.850  0.877  0.881  -0.027  (0.070)  -0.031  (0.071) 
mid_sch  0.325  0.369  0.339  -0.044  (0.096)  -0.014  (0.097) 
hi_scho  0.250  0.200  0.186  0.050  (0.085)  0.064  (0.086) 
cbsch  0.250  0.092  0.102  0.158 **  (0.078)  0.148 *  (0.080) 
d_madra  0.475  0.446  0.407  0.029  (0.101)  0.068  (0.103) 
Dispute settlement forums (DSF) 
jirga  0.850  0.769  0.780  0.081  (0.078)  0.070  (0.079) 
dsf  0.925  0.769  0.780  0.156 **  (0.067)  0.145 **  (0.069) 
ler  0.650  0.738  0.712  -0.088  (0.094)  -0.062  (0.097) 
Susceptiblity to natural disasters 
fld_dmg  0.975  0.815  0.814  0.160 ***  (0.055)  0.161 ***  (0.057) 
Notes: 1. The standard errors are reported in parenthesis, estimated under the asssumption that allow unequal variance of 
two groups. 2. The definition of a CO village is the default definition (listed as having a CO or similar activities in the 
PHKN village list). 3. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
26Table 3. Correlates of program participation (village-level multiple regression results) 
Depedent variable: d_co1 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
Demography 
lit_rate  -0.0017  -0.0003  -0.0010  -0.0016  0.0000 
[0.0035]  [0.0035]  [0.0035]  [0.0031]  [0.0031] 
vil_pop/1000  -0.0065  0.0000  -0.0034  0.0076  0.0121 
[0.0381]  [0.0371]  [0.0338]  [0.0370]  [0.0325] 
agri_prof_prc  -0.0023  -0.0026  -0.0035  -0.0023  -0.0036 
[0.0026]  [0.0025]  [0.0027]  [0.0024]  [0.0025] 
Basic amenities, infrastructure, and shops 
irrigated_village  -0.0380  -0.0405  -0.0698  -0.0930  -0.1132 
[0.1386]  [0.1372]  [0.1354]  [0.1385]  [0.1330] 
rd_length  -0.0135***  -0.0140***  -0.0126***  -0.0121***  -0.0119*** 
[0.0043]  [0.0041]  [0.0044]  [0.0045]  [0.0044] 
cln_drnk_wat  -0.0002  -0.0003  -0.0005  -0.0010  -0.0013 
[0.0019]  [0.0018]  [0.0018]  [0.0017]  [0.0017] 
gas  -0.3630*  -0.3680**  -0.4254**  -0.3433*  -0.4076** 
[0.1992]  [0.1847]  [0.1953]  [0.1825]  [0.1793] 
i_net  -0.2144  -0.2104  -0.1945  -0.2345  -0.2098 
[0.1845]  [0.1690]  [0.1730]  [0.1746]  [0.1633] 
kar_shop  -0.1575  -0.1550  -0.1483  -0.1895  -0.1733 
[0.1516]  [0.1579]  [0.1474]  [0.1349]  [0.1402] 
Access to education and medical facilities 
prim_school  -0.0479  -0.0298  -0.0498  -0.0585  -0.0461 
[0.1440]  [0.1454]  [0.1440]  [0.1368]  [0.1391] 
mid_sch  -0.0633  -0.0635  -0.0668  -0.0992  -0.0957 
[0.1129]  [0.1115]  [0.1106]  [0.1148]  [0.1118] 
hi_scho  0.0990  0.0627  0.0830  0.0007  -0.0194 
[0.1545]  [0.1580]  [0.1532]  [0.1550]  [0.1556] 
d_madra  0.1413  0.1481  0.0934  0.1464  0.1062 
[0.1168]  [0.1169]  [0.1110]  [0.1170]  [0.1126] 
bhu  0.1013  0.0421  0.0734  0.0959  0.0316 
[0.1669]  [0.1676]  [0.1672]  [0.1603]  [0.1583] 
Susceptiblity to natural disasters 
dis_prone_vil  0.2290  0.2580  0.1967  0.2652*  0.2481* 
[0.1555]  [0.1562]  [0.1537]  [0.1525]  [0.1489] 
Potentially endogenous variables 
dsf  0.2450**  0.1649 
[0.1192]  [0.1318] 
cbsch  0.3007**  0.2757** 
[0.1342]  [0.1229] 
tba  0.3076***  0.2482** 
[0.0972]  [0.1035] 
R-squared  0.288  0.317  0.327  0.347  0.392 
F-statistics  5.922  4.363  6.795  5.502  8.208 
Level of Significance  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Notes: 1. In addition to those explanatory variables listed above, intercept, Mansehra dummy, and 
Abbotabad dummy are also included. 2. Estimated by OLS (linear probability model), with robust standard 
errors (reported in brackets). 3. The number of observations is 105. 4. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
27Table 4. Summary statistics of CO-level variables 
Description  Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
CO characteristics fixed at the time of formation 
Number of CO members  mem_no  23.44  5.08  16  40 
Dummy for a male CO  co_type  0.256  dummy  0  1 
Incubation period in days (time from the first 
PHKN contact to the CO formation)  incub_per  50.14  54.08  1  398 
Age of the CO in months (time from the CO 
formation to the survey date)  co_age  44.93  39.45  0  163 
President's age (years)  age_presi  39.34  10.34  22  75 
President's education (years)  edu_presi  5.31  5.21  0  14 
Secretary's age (years)  age_sec  34.16  10.26  20  63 
Secretary's education (years)  edu_sec  7.53  5.10  0  14 
Activist's age (years)  acti_age  36.10  12.80  18  70 
Activist's education (years)  acti_edu  6.08  5.40  0  16 
PHKN activities after the CO formation 
Total of savings by CO members (Rs.)  saving  7869.33  4262.23  500  20000 
Average savings per member (Rs.)  saving_pc  357.77  221.78  20  1111 
Dummy for microfinance lending activity  mf  0.267  dummy  0  1 
Dummy for micro-infrastructure project (MIP)  mip  0.356  dummy  0  1 
Number of MIPs completed  comp_mips_no  0.400  0.632  0  3 
Leadership and managerial skill development 
trainings  lmst  0.244  dummy  0  1 
Non-conventional human resource 
development trainings  nct  0.544  dummy  0  1 
Natural disaster management trainings  ndm_nct  0.233  dummy  0  1 
Note: The number of observations is 90. 
28Table 5. Comparison of female COs and male COs 
Mean for each group  Difference (A)-(B) 
(A) Female  (B) Male  Mean  (S.E.) Variable  COs (n =67)  COs (n =23) 
CO characteristics fixed at the time of formation 
mem_no  22.91  25.00  -2.09 **  (1.01) 
incub_per  50.72  48.48  2.24  (11.66) 
co_age  53.49  20.00  33.49 ***  (6.88) 
age_presi  38.51  41.78  -3.28  (2.26) 
edu_presi  3.85  9.57  -5.71 ***  (0.99) 
age_sec  32.31  39.52  -7.21 **  (3.05) 
edu_sec  6.67  10.04  -3.37 ***  (1.02) 
acti_age  35.36  38.26  -2.90  (3.48) 
acti_edu  5.15  8.78  -3.63 ***  (1.25) 
PHKN activities after the CO formation 
saving  8189.60  6936.39  1253.21  (1126.76) 
saving_pc  380.65  291.12  89.53  (54.15) 
mf  0.358  0.000  0.358 ***  (0.059) 
mip  0.418  0.174  0.244 **  (0.101) 
comp_mips_no  0.493  0.130  0.362 ***  (0.110) 
lmst  0.224  0.304  -0.080  (0.111) 
nct  0.687  0.130  0.556 ***  (0.092) 
ndm_nct  0.284  0.087  0.197 **  (0.082) 
Notes: 1. The standard errors are reported in parenthesis, estimated under the asssumption that 
allow unequal variance of two groups. 2. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
29Table 6. Correlates of CO performance (CO-level multiple regression results) 
Depedent variable: 
saving_pc  mf  mip 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 1  Model 2  Model 1  Model 2 
Village-level variables 
lit_rate  0.4275  2.0116  0.0032  0.0041  0.0099**  0.0093*** 
[1.6263]  [1.7977]  [0.0036]  [0.0034]  [0.0038]  [0.0034] 
vil_pop/1000  -5.8312  -5.3699  0.0468  0.0322  -0.0316  -0.032 
[17.3736]  [19.6712]  [0.0429]  [0.0385]  [0.0433]  [0.0397] 
agri_prof_prc  1.7682  1.3408  0.0069*** 0.0069***  0.0036  0.002 
[1.2905]  [1.2048]  [0.0023]  [0.0024]  [0.0026]  [0.0021] 
rd_length  -3.7257  -4.964  -0.0017  -0.0004  -0.0202** -0.0053 
[4.7531]  [4.8117]  [0.0074]  [0.0074]  [0.0083]  [0.0077] 
cln_drnk_wat  2.4710*** 1.2044  0.001  -0.0005  0.0029**  -0.0017 
[0.6610]  [0.7912]  [0.0013]  [0.0016]  [0.0013]  [0.0013] 
CO characteristics fixed at the time of formation 
mem_no  -13.7546***  -0.0102  -0.0150* 
[4.4261]  [0.0096]  [0.0087] 
co_type  -108.593  -0.3879***  0.1307 
[77.8009]  [0.1018]  [0.1319] 
incub_per  0.5790**  0.0001  0.0004 
[0.2465]  [0.0006]  [0.0006] 
co_age  -0.3506  0.0013  0.0067*** 
[0.7931]  [0.0014]  [0.0011] 
age_leader$  10.4605***  0.0164***  -0.001 
[3.1007]  [0.0055]  [0.0049] 
edu_leader$  9.8571  0.0237*  -0.0158 
[6.4012]  [0.0123]  [0.0125] 
acti_age  -0.0431  0.0006  -0.0023 
[1.8313]  [0.0037]  [0.0035] 
acti_edu  -0.9549  0.0045  -0.0166* 
[5.6769]  [0.0092]  [0.0092] 
Intercept  102.0245  71.3986  -0.4978** -0.9124*  -0.1619  0.4427 
[121.1415] [204.8103]  [0.1953]  [0.5048]  [0.2382]  [0.3952] 
R-squared  0.200  0.407  0.260  0.413  0.244  0.521 
F-statistics  7.852  6.891  7.292  6.126  8.391  26.102 
Level of Significance  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Notes: 1. The number of observations is 90, all of which are in District Haripur. 2. Estimated by OLS (i.e., linear 
probability model when the dependent variable is mf or mip), with robust standard errors reported in brackets. 3. * 
p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01 
$ "age_leader" is the average of the age of president and that of secretary while "edu_leader" is the average of the 
education years of president and that of secretary. 
30Table 7. Correlation among CO performance indicators 
Based on observed values  Based on regression residuals 
saving_pc  mf  mip  saving_pc  mf  mip 
Bivariate correlation coefficients 
saving_pc  1  1 
mf  0.4773*** 1  0.2546**  1 
mip  0.3815*** 0.3394*** 1  0.1967*  0.0659  1 
Bivariate regression coefficient 
saving_pc /100  0.0957*** 0.0828***  0.0508**  0.0384* 
[0.0188]  [0.0229]  [0.0206]  [0.0230] 
R-squared  0.228  0.146  0.065  0.039 
F-statistics  25.833  13.076  6.109  2.773 
Level of Significance  0.000  0.001  0.015  0.099 
Notes: 1. The number of observations is 90, all of which are in District Haripur. 2. The regression model is a linear 
probability model estimated by OLS with only the intercept and the per-capita saving in Rs.100 are used as 
explanatory variables, with robust standard errors in brackets. 3. * p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. 
31Table 8. Summary statistics of household-level variables 
Description  Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Demography 
Number of household members  hhsize  6.17  2.69  1  16 
Ratio of female members over male members  fem_rate  1.14  0.87  0  5 
Dummy for a female-headed household  fem_hh  0.086  dummy  0  1 
Years of education of the household head  hh_edu  5.92  4.37  0  16 
Literacy status of the household head  hh_lite  0.732  dummy  0  1 
Age of the household head  hh_age  49.72  13.99  20  90 
Susceptibility to natural disasters 
The household was affected by 2010 floods  fldaffecte~h  0.343  dummy  0  1 
The household suffered damages due to 
attacks by wild boars 
wildboar_a~k  0.338  dummy  0  1 
Household asset indicators 
The flooring of the house is paved or not  h_floor  0.123  dummy  0  1 
The house has drainage  drainge  0.429  dummy  0  1 
The house is connected with gas for cooking  gas  0.081  dummy  0  1 
Value of land owned by the hh (Rs.1,000,000)  land_val  0.579  1.492  0  25.000 
Value of livestock owned by the hh 
(Rs.1,000,000)  livestock_~l  0.034  0.067  0  0.857 
The household has and uses a radio  radio  0.300  dummy  0  1 
The household uses internet  internet  0.005  dummy  0  1 
The house is connected with cable TV  cab_tv  0.014  dummy  0  1 
Household income inflow and outflow 
No of hh members employed on the full time 
base  fulltime_e~o  1.468  0.875  0  5 
Remittance recipient status  remittance  0.197  dummy  0  1 
Zakat/Ushr recipient status  zu_in  0.033  dummy  0  1 
Zakat/Ushr payer status  zu_out  0.106  dummy  0  1 
Household annual consumption expenditure including the imputed value of in-kind transactions 
Total non-food expenditure (Rs.1,000)  exp_nonfd  67.920  65.954  3  763 
Total food expenditure (Rs.1,000)  exp_food  164.510  76.86  21  649 
Total expenditure (Rs.1,000)  tot_exp  232.430  128.05  28  1357 
Total expenditure per capita (Rs.1,000)  exp_pc  39.987  17.11  12  143 
Total food expenditure per adult equivalence 
units* (Rs.1,000)  food_pae  37.062  13.94  11  110 
Women's mobility 
Indicator taking the value of 3 if women of the  mean  w_emp=1  w_emp=2  w_emp=3 
household are allowed to move freely within 
the village without permission, 2 if they are  w_emp 
1.777  43.1%  36.2%  20.8% allowed to move within the village but 
permission required, and 1 otherwise 
Note: The number of observations is 583. 
* The adult equivalne units we used are: 0.25 for infants (age<=5), 0.5 for children (age>5 & age<=14), 0.8 for teenagers 
(age>14 & age<=18), 0.9 for female adults (age>18 & age<=60), 1.0 for male adults (age>18 & age<=60), and 0.8 for the 
elderly (age>60). 
32Table 9. Comparison of household characteristics by PHKN treatment status 
Mean for each group  Difference (T )-(C 1)  Difference (T )-(C 2) 
(C 1) Non- (C 2) 
(T ) CO  member  Househol 
member  household  d in non- Mean  (S.E.)  Mean  (S.E.)
household  in CO  CO 
(n =249)  villages  villages 
Variable  (n =234)  (n =100) 
Demography 
hhsize  6.18  6.02  6.51  0.16  (0.24)  -0.33  (0.34) 
fem_rate  1.15  1.11  1.20  0.04  (0.08)  -0.05  (0.11) 
fem_hh  0.080  0.107  0.050  -0.027  (0.027)  0.030  (0.028) 
hh_edu  6.21  5.57  6.00  0.64  (0.40)  0.21  (0.52) 
hh_lite  0.763  0.709  0.710  0.054  (0.040)  0.053  (0.053) 
hh_age  49.30  50.06  49.98  -0.77  (1.29)  -0.68  (1.62) 
Susceptibility to natural disasters 
fldaffecte~h  0.390  0.274  0.390  0.116 ***  (0.043)  0.000  (0.058) 
wildboar_a~k  0.402  0.299  0.270  0.102 **  (0.043)  0.132 **  (0.054) 
Household asset indicators 
h_floor  0.120  0.090  0.210  0.031  (0.028)  -0.090 *  (0.046) 
drainge  0.394  0.368  0.660  0.026  (0.044)  -0.266 ***  (0.057) 
gas  0.000  0.004  0.460  -0.004  (0.004)  -0.460 ***  (0.050) 
land_val  0.503  0.429  1.117  0.074  (0.086)  -0.614 **  (0.296) 
livestock_~l  0.034  0.036  0.031  -0.001  (0.006)  0.004  (0.007) 
radio  0.329  0.321  0.180  0.009  (0.043)  0.149 ***  (0.049) 
internet  0.000  0.000  0.030  0.000  (0.000)  -0.030 *  (0.017) 
cab_tv  0.008  0.000  0.060  0.008  (0.006)  -0.052 **  (0.025) 
Household income inflow and outflow 
fulltime_e~o  1.438  1.474  1.530  -0.037  (0.080)  -0.092  (0.104) 
remittance  0.213  0.175  0.210  0.038  (0.036)  0.003  (0.048) 
zu_in  0.032  0.047  0.000  -0.015  (0.018)  0.032 ***  (0.011) 
zu_out  0.129  0.064  0.150  0.064 **  (0.027)  -0.021  (0.042) 
Household annual consumption expenditure including the imputed value of in-kind transactions 
exp_nonfd  66.11  59.56  91.99  6.55  (5.23)  -25.88 **  (10.07) 
exp_food  158.94  156.60  196.88  2.33  (6.66)  -37.94 ***  (9.76) 
tot_exp  225.05  216.16  288.87  8.88  (10.77)  -63.82 ***  (17.29) 
exp_pc  39.09  37.94  46.99  1.15  (1.47)  -7.90 ***  (2.24) 
food_pae  36.27  35.93  41.69  0.34  (1.23)  -5.43 ***  (1.76) 
Women's mobility 
w_emp  1.976  1.611  1.670  0.365 ***  (0.067)  0.306 ***  (0.093) 
Notes: 1. The standard errors are reported in parenthesis, estimated under the asssumption that allow unequal variance of 
two groups. 2. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
33Table 10. Correlates of household consumption (household-level multiple regression results) 
Depedent variable: 
tot_exp  exp_pc  food_pae  w_emp 
Household demographic and asset characteristics 
hhsize  22.7355***  -2.9344***  -1.7487***  -0.0065 
[1.7794]  [0.3368]  [0.2509]  [0.0136] 
fem_hh  -19.1609*  0.3929  0.9666  0.0802 
[9.9353]  [2.0832]  [1.9053]  [0.1053] 
hh_edu  3.4119***  0.6019***  0.4563***  0.0223*** 
[1.1835]  [0.1654]  [0.1421]  [0.0074] 
hh_age  0.7351**  0.1292**  -0.0164  -0.0004 
[0.3134]  [0.0498]  [0.0375]  [0.0035] 
h_floor  36.9816*  4.0046  3.9557**  -0.1581* 
[19.6135]  [2.7523]  [1.9076]  [0.0874] 
drainge  8.915  1.0248  -0.0426  0.0576 
[10.8062]  [1.5358]  [1.0818]  [0.0705] 
land_val  1.6037  0.3128  -0.1558  -0.0027 
[5.4036]  [0.7265]  [0.4238]  [0.0289] 
livestock_val  267.8397  26.7596  19.9533*  0.4311 
[197.9322]  [19.0811]  [11.5494]  [0.6506] 
fulltime_ehhm_no  10.4277**  1.1999*  -1.7794***  -0.0296 
[4.3890]  [0.6959]  [0.6534]  [0.0322] 
remittance  46.4063***  7.2340***  4.9927***  0.0519 
[11.5239]  [1.8594]  [1.4802]  [0.0804] 
fldaffected_hh  -12.7057  -2.8444*  -1.4116  0.0409 
[8.8682]  [1.4996]  [1.0730]  [0.0612] 
Without PHKN treatment 
dummy for C 1  -2.022  -1.3197  -0.1751  -0.3497*** 
[5.3752]  [1.1173]  [0.9566]  [0.0419] 
dummy for C 2  49.5255**  8.0855***  6.1352***  -0.2915*** 
[18.7046]  [2.9087]  [2.1252]  [0.1078] 
Intercept  -9.3223  42.9849***  45.9611***  1.8910*** 
[24.1740]  [4.5991]  [3.7852]  [0.2188] 
R-squared  0.522  0.246  0.213  0.073 
F-statistics  33.003  40.582  14.323  16.682 
Level of Significance  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Notes: 1. The number of observations is 583, all of which are in District Haripur. 2. Estimated by 
OLS, with robust standard errors clustered at the village level reported in brackets. 3. * p <0.1, ** 
p <0 05  *** p <0 01 





















Mean (S.E.) Mean (S.E.)
Adult females (age: 20-60)
number of obs. 380 358 164
d_lit 0.639 0.668 0.518 -0.028 (0.035) 0.121 *** (0.046)
educ_yrs 4.40 4.55 4.70 -0.15 (0.32) -0.30 (0.46)
d_work 0.061 0.031 0.030 0.030 * (0.015) 0.030 * (0.018)
Adult males (age: 20-60)
number of obs. 405 369 187
d_lit 0.916 0.900 0.898 0.016 (0.021) 0.018 (0.026)
educ_yrs 8.27 7.84 8.71 0.43 * (0.26) -0.44 (0.33)
d_work 0.746 0.789 0.743 -0.043 (0.030) 0.002 (0.039)
Girls (age: 0-5)
number of obs. 41 44 21
wgt_ratio 1.151 1.144 1.231 0.007 (0.051) -0.079 ** (0.045)
Boys (age: 0-5)
number of obs. 42 40 32
wgt_ratio 1.154 1.104 1.129 0.050 (0.043) 0.025 (0.039)
Girls (age: 6-10)
number of obs. 108 82 37
d_enrol 0.991 0.988 1.000 0.003 (0.015) -0.009 (0.009)
Boys (age: 6-10)
number of obs. 110 104 27
d_enrol 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Girls (age: 11-15)
number of obs. 84 77 39
d_enrol 0.917 0.766 0.846 0.150 *** (0.057) 0.071 (0.066)
Boys (age: 11-15)
number of obs. 90 85 28
d_enrol 0.989 0.965 0.929 0.024 (0.023) 0.060 (0.051)
Notes: 1. The standard errors are reported in parenthesis, estimated under the assumption that allow unequal variance of two
groups. 2. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Welfare indicators (in italics) are as follows: d_lit = literacy dummy, educ_yrs = completed years of education, d_work =
dummy for market-oriented work (including unpaid work for self-employment business and farming but excluding household
domestic chores), wgt_ratio = the child's weight divided by the WHO standard weight for the same age (calculated in
months), d_enrol = dummy for the current enrollment in school.
Mean for each group Difference (T)-(C 1) Difference (T)-(C 2)
35Table 12. Correlates of human capital investment in children (individual-level regression results) 
Dep.var = wgt_ratio (weight-for  Dep.var = d_enrol (school 
age), children aged 0-5  enrollment), children aged 11-15 
Girls  Boys  Girls  Boys 
Household demographic and asset characteristics 
hhsize  0.0053  0.0125  0.0137  0.0125 
[0.0179]  [0.0084]  [0.0126]  [0.0074] 
fem_hh  -0.0104  -0.114  0.0803  -0.0535 
[0.0884]  [0.1144]  [0.1006]  [0.0921] 
hh_edu  0.0027  -0.0027  0.0100*  0.0004 
[0.0067]  [0.0073]  [0.0051]  [0.0033] 
hh_age  0.0008  -0.0027  -0.0069***  -0.0008 
[0.0022]  [0.0026]  [0.0022]  [0.0019] 
h_floor  0.0117  0.0377  0.0845  0.0381* 
[0.0549]  [0.0496]  [0.0714]  [0.0191] 
drainge  0.0612*  0.045  0.0238  -0.0031 
[0.0341]  [0.0477]  [0.0601]  [0.0260] 
land_val  -0.0132  -0.0156  -0.0218  0.0085* 
[0.0269]  [0.0187]  [0.0200]  [0.0048] 
livestock_val  -0.2062  -0.1995  0.6976  -0.2093 
[0.8695]  [0.2665]  [0.5075]  [0.1606] 
fulltime_ehhm_no  -0.0284  0.0064  -0.0142  -0.0275 
[0.0376]  [0.0212]  [0.0446]  [0.0211] 
remittance  0.0091  -0.0184  0.0144  0.0419** 
[0.0863]  [0.0501]  [0.0863]  [0.0201] 
fldaffected_hh  0.0826  0.0281  0.1212**  0.0048 
[0.0579]  [0.0454]  [0.0477]  [0.0276] 
No PHKN treatment 
dummy for C 1  0.0095  -0.0237  -0.1157*  -0.0125 
[0.0692]  [0.0396]  [0.0591]  [0.0215] 
dummy for C 2  0.0645  -0.0322  -0.0407  -0.062 
[0.0715]  [0.0456]  [0.0673]  [0.0476] 
Age controls  Polynomials upto the 5th, age in months  Full set of age (in years) dummies 
R-squared  0.098  0.233  0.217  0.072 
F-statistics  5.766  4.383  6.091  1.758 
Level of Significance  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.078 
Number of observations  106  114  200  203 
Notes: 1. Estimated by OLS (i.e., linear probability model when the dependent variable is d_enrol ), with robust 
standard errors clustered at the village level (reported in brackets). 2. * p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. 
36Appendix Table 1. Comparison of CO villages and non-CO villages under different definitions of a "CO village" 
Narrower definition of CO villages  Wider definition of CO villages 
Difference: (A: CO  Difference: (A: CO  Difference: (A: CO  Difference: (A': CO 
villages)-(B: Non-CO,  villages)-(B: Non-CO,  villages, all)-(B: Non- villages, Haripur)-(B: 
all)  Haripur)  CO, all)  Non-CO, Haripur) 
Variable  Mean  (S.E.)  Mean  (S.E.)  Mean  (S.E.)  Mean  (S.E.) 
Demography 
lit_rate  -12.37 ***  (3.92)  -11.94 ***  (3.96)  -12.37 ***  (3.92)  -7.91 **  (3.90) 
vil_pop  -484.00  (418.59)  -374.18  (421.06)  -484.00  (418.59)  -223.17  (372.95) 
agri_prof_~c  -2.64  (4.83)  -5.62  (4.73)  -2.64  (4.83)  -0.39  (4.22) 
services  -5.67 *  (3.24)  -4.99  (3.23)  -5.67 *  (3.24)  -4.51  (2.96) 
self_emp  -3.19 **  (1.30)  -1.40  (1.03)  -3.19 **  (1.30)  -1.33  (1.08) 
lab_nform  6.15 **  (2.78)  6.16 **  (2.82)  6.15 **  (2.78)  3.52  (2.37) 
other_prof  5.35 **  (2.42)  5.84 **  (2.41)  5.35 **  (2.42)  2.70  (1.63) 
Basic amenities, infrastructure, and shops 
irrigated_~e  -0.088  (0.099)  -0.112  (0.101)  -0.088  (0.099)  -0.072  (0.093) 
rd_length  3.54  (2.16)  2.67  (2.22)  3.54  (2.16)  -2.62  (2.31) 
cln_drnk_wat  -11.58  (8.03)  -11.36  (8.08)  -11.58  (8.03)  -4.79  (6.73) 
gas  -0.272 ***  (0.050)  -0.213 ***  (0.048)  -0.272 ***  (0.050)  -0.229 ***  (0.062) 
c_tv  -0.292 ***  (0.067)  -0.265 ***  (0.068)  -0.292 ***  (0.067)  -0.113  (0.085) 
i_net  -0.333 ***  (0.053)  -0.320 ***  (0.054)  -0.333 ***  (0.053)  -0.239 ***  (0.079) 
kar_shop  -0.198 *  (0.105)  -0.187 *  (0.107)  -0.198 *  (0.105)  -0.139  (0.084) 
veg_shop  0.160  (0.113)  0.187  (0.114)  0.160  (0.113)  0.167  (0.101) 
frt_shop  -0.182 *  (0.106)  -0.150  (0.107)  -0.182 *  (0.106)  -0.065  (0.099) 
Existence of medical facilities in the village 
bhu  0.006  (0.088)  0.007  (0.089)  0.006  (0.088)  -0.061  (0.074) 
rhu  -0.008  (0.048)  0.002  (0.047)  -0.008  (0.048)  -0.026  (0.038) 
dr_bhu_rhu  -0.073  (0.082)  -0.075  (0.083)  -0.073  (0.082)  -0.095  (0.076) 
tba  0.262 ***  (0.078)  0.263 ***  (0.080)  0.262 ***  (0.078)  0.181 **  (0.087) 
Existence of education institutions in the village 
prim_school  0.011  (0.079)  0.008  (0.079)  0.011  (0.079)  -0.031  (0.071) 
mid_sch  0.029  (0.114)  0.055  (0.115)  0.029  (0.114)  -0.014  (0.097) 
hi_scho  0.148  (0.107)  0.160  (0.108)  0.148  (0.107)  0.064  (0.086) 
cbsch  0.073  (0.093)  0.062  (0.094)  0.073  (0.093)  0.148 *  (0.080) 
d_madra  -0.106  (0.115)  -0.078  (0.116)  -0.106  (0.115)  0.068  (0.103) 
Dispute settlement forums (DSF) 
jirga  0.043  (0.090)  0.033  (0.091)  0.043  (0.090)  0.070  (0.079) 
dsf  0.168 **  (0.062)  0.158 **  (0.062)  0.168 **  (0.062)  0.145 **  (0.069) 
ler  -0.103  (0.113)  -0.082  (0.114)  -0.103  (0.113)  -0.062  (0.097) 
Susceptiblity to natural disasters 
fld_dmg  0.160 ***  (0.044)  0.160 ***  (0.043)  0.211 ***  (0.069)  0.209 ***  (0.072) 
Notes: 1. The standard errors are reported in parenthesis, estimated under the asssumption that allow unequal variance of two groups. 
2. The narrower definition of a CO village is that the village has currently registered COs; the wider definition of a CO village is those 
villages listed as having a CO or similar activities in the PHKN village list or those villages that had initial contact with PHKN but 
villagers failed to form a CO. The number of observation under the narrower definition is A=24, B=81, C=75, while that under the 
wider definition is A=60, B=45, A'=58, C=41. 4. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
37Appendix Table 2. Correlates of program participation (narrower definition of a CO village) 
Depedent variable: d_co2 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
Demography 
lit_rate  -0.0033  -0.0026  -0.0029  -0.0032  -0.0028 
[0.0031]  [0.0031]  [0.0031]  [0.0026]  [0.0027] 
vil_pop/1000  -0.0187  -0.0156  -0.0172  -0.0031  -0.0021 
[0.0367]  [0.0365]  [0.0368]  [0.0341]  [0.0344] 
agri_prof_prc  -0.0037  -0.0039  -0.0043*  -0.0038  -0.0042* 
[0.0026]  [0.0025]  [0.0026]  [0.0023]  [0.0023] 
Basic amenities, infrastructure, and shops 
irrigated_village  -0.0042  -0.0054  -0.0196  -0.0652  -0.0755 
[0.1088]  [0.1114]  [0.1149]  [0.1082]  [0.1132] 
rd_length  -0.0049  -0.0051  -0.0045  -0.0033  -0.0031 
[0.0036]  [0.0037]  [0.0037]  [0.0035]  [0.0036] 
cln_drnk_wat  -0.0012  -0.0012  -0.0013  -0.0021  -0.0022 
[0.0018]  [0.0018]  [0.0017]  [0.0016]  [0.0016] 
gas  -0.0753  -0.0777  -0.1055  -0.0535  -0.0779 
[0.1140]  [0.1165]  [0.1201]  [0.1329]  [0.1405] 
i_net  -0.2492**  -0.2473**  -0.2396**  -0.2715**  -0.2632** 
[0.1007]  [0.1023]  [0.1036]  [0.1235]  [0.1286] 
kar_shop  -0.1419  -0.1408  -0.1375  -0.1775  -0.1728 
[0.1307]  [0.1295]  [0.1315]  [0.1161]  [0.1180] 
Access to education and medical facilities 
prim_school  0.0892  0.0977  0.0883  0.0774  0.0778 
[0.1206]  [0.1231]  [0.1202]  [0.1164]  [0.1172] 
mid_sch  -0.0394  -0.0396  -0.0411  -0.0793  -0.0795 
[0.1027]  [0.1031]  [0.1020]  [0.0989]  [0.0997] 
hi_scho  0.2223  0.2052  0.2146  0.1134  0.1090 
[0.1706]  [0.1721]  [0.1709]  [0.1642]  [0.1660] 
d_madra  -0.0381  -0.0348  -0.0612  -0.0324  -0.0504 
[0.1070]  [0.1075]  [0.1041]  [0.0994]  [0.0995] 
bhu  0.1332  0.1053  0.1197  0.1273  0.1144 
[0.1726]  [0.1759]  [0.1759]  [0.1595]  [0.1660] 
Susceptiblity to natural disasters 
dis_prone_vil  0.1198  0.1334  0.1042  0.1599  0.1477 
[0.1236]  [0.1248]  [0.1253]  [0.1267]  [0.1281] 
Potentially endogenous variables 
dsf  0.1154  0.0105 
[0.0837]  [0.0900] 
cbsch  0.1453  0.1137 
[0.1392]  [0.1247] 
tba  0.3410***  0.3308*** 
[0.0889]  [0.0880] 
R-squared  0.261  0.270  0.273  0.359  0.366 
F-statistics  2.533  2.166  2.361  2.922  2.578 
Level of Significance  0.003  0.010  0.004  0.001  0.001 
Notes: See Table 3. The narrower definition of a CO village is that the village has currently registered COs; 
the wider definition of a CO village is those villages listed as having a CO or similar activities in the PHKN 
village list or those villages that had initial contact with PHKN but villagers failed to form a CO. 
38Appendix Table 3. Correlates of program participation (wider definition of a CO village) 
Depedent variable: d_co3 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
Demography 
lit_rate  0.0006  0.0015  0.001  0.0006  0.0017 
[0.0029]  [0.0031]  [0.0029]  [0.0030]  [0.0032] 
vil_pop/1000  -0.0019  0.0025  0.0001  0.0073  0.0104 
[0.0370]  [0.0360]  [0.0342]  [0.0362]  [0.0331] 
agri_prof_prc  0.0009  0.0007  0.0001  0.0009  0 
[0.0025]  [0.0024]  [0.0026]  [0.0024]  [0.0025] 
Basic amenities, infrastructure, and shops 
irrigated_village  -0.0821  -0.0838  -0.1031  -0.1183  -0.1315 
[0.1216]  [0.1192]  [0.1185]  [0.1228]  [0.1177] 
rd_length  -0.0079  -0.0082  -0.0074  -0.007  -0.0069 
[0.0055]  [0.0054]  [0.0056]  [0.0054]  [0.0055] 
cln_drnk_wat  -0.0035**  -0.0036**  -0.0037**  -0.0041***  -0.0042*** 
[0.0015]  [0.0014]  [0.0015]  [0.0015]  [0.0015] 
gas  -0.2744  -0.2777  -0.3157*  -0.2614  -0.3042* 
[0.1909]  [0.1795]  [0.1896]  [0.1823]  [0.1782] 
i_net  -0.0949  -0.0922  -0.0818  -0.1082  -0.0916 
[0.1575]  [0.1536]  [0.1525]  [0.1567]  [0.1545] 
kar_shop  -0.2438*  -0.2421*  -0.2377*  -0.2649**  -0.2539** 
[0.1267]  [0.1292]  [0.1261]  [0.1200]  [0.1226] 
Access to education and medical facilities 
prim_school  0.0619  0.0743  0.0607  0.0549  0.0636 
[0.1625]  [0.1651]  [0.1634]  [0.1645]  [0.1671] 
mid_sch  -0.098  -0.0982  -0.1004  -0.1217  -0.1192 
[0.1103]  [0.1086]  [0.1099]  [0.1051]  [0.1045] 
hi_scho  0.0422  0.0174  0.0316  -0.0225  -0.0362 
[0.1457]  [0.1493]  [0.1426]  [0.1500]  [0.1488] 
d_madra  0.074  0.0787  0.0424  0.0774  0.0509 
[0.1102]  [0.1115]  [0.1100]  [0.1106]  [0.1125] 
bhu  0.1383  0.0978  0.1199  0.1348  0.0908 
[0.1623]  [0.1654]  [0.1571]  [0.1590]  [0.1552] 
Susceptiblity to natural disasters 
dis_prone_vil  0.3163*  0.3361*  0.2949*  0.3401**  0.3293* 
[0.1711]  [0.1848]  [0.1714]  [0.1611]  [0.1723] 
Potentially endogenous variables 
dsf  0.1676  0.1154 
[0.1477]  [0.1572] 
cbsch  0.1991  0.1827 
[0.1307]  [0.1275] 
tba  0.2025*  0.1617 
[0.1102]  [0.1176] 
R-squared  0.267  0.280  0.283  0.292  0.311 
F-statistics  5.382  5.504  6.686  6.762  8.394 
Level of Significance  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Notes: See Table 3. The narrower definition of a CO village is that the village has currently registered COs; 
the wider definition of a CO village is those villages listed as having a CO or similar activities in the PHKN 
village list or those villages that had initial contact with PHKN but villagers failed to form a CO. 
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Appendix Table 4. Correlates of household consumption (household-level multiple regression results) 
(Subsample excluding T -type households belonging to a male CO) 
Depedent variable: 
tot_exp  exp_pc  food_pae  w_emp 
Household demographic and asset characteristics 
hhsize  22.2272***  -2.8980***  -1.7029***  -0.0086 
[1.9373]  [0.3696]  [0.2933]  [0.0151] 
fem_hh  -16.3655  0.8687  1.6481  0.093 
[9.9753]  [2.0317]  [1.8833]  [0.0986] 
hh_edu  3.4891***  0.5457***  0.4352***  0.0236*** 
[1.2577]  [0.1690]  [0.1399]  [0.0083] 
hh_age  0.7845**  0.1282*  -0.022  -0.0005 
[0.3826]  [0.0665]  [0.0448]  [0.0038] 
h_floor  34.3449  3.6806  4.3145**  -0.2673*** 
[21.4397]  [2.8170]  [2.0549]  [0.0889] 
drainge  7.231  0.9458  -0.085  0.0885 
[10.0679]  [1.3717]  [1.0723]  [0.0768] 
land_val  -1.4197  -0.0102  -0.3138  -0.0169 
[4.2829]  [0.6038]  [0.3485]  [0.0258] 
livestock_val  271.9248  27.5096  19.1742  0.6028 
[194.3375]  [18.9763]  [11.4958]  [0.6997] 
fulltime_ehhm_no  13.2279**  1.2999  -1.4977**  -0.0189 
[5.6989]  [0.7717]  [0.7052]  [0.0378] 
remittance  49.4871***  7.7358***  4.7934***  0.0261 
[12.8708]  [2.2688]  [1.6870]  [0.0837] 
fldaffected_hh  -16.6806*  -3.1470*  -1.5507  0.0126 
[9.6085]  [1.5852]  [1.1284]  [0.0643] 
Without PHKN treatment 
dummy for C 1  3.5264  0.0638  1.0546  -0.3308*** 
[7.8281]  [1.5422]  [1.2611]  [0.0462] 
dummy for C 2  58.5620***  9.8022***  7.4714***  -0.2530** 
[19.0078]  [3.0001]  [2.1671]  [0.1066] 
Intercept  -16.5847  41.7141***  44.5137***  1.8745*** 
[23.1413]  [4.7254]  [3.8168]  [0.2302] 
R-squared  0.523  0.250  0.215  0.071 
F-statistics  37.125  34.007  11.813  12.940 
Level of Significance  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Notes: See Table 10. The number of observations is 514. 
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Appendix Table 5. Correlates of human capital investment in children (individual-level regression results) 
(Subsample excluding T -type households belonging to a male CO) 
Dep.var = wgt_ratio (weight-for  Dep.var = d_enrol (school 
age), children aged 0-5  enrollment), children aged 11-15 
Girls  Boys  Girls  Boys 
Household demographic and asset characteristics 
hhsize  0.004  0.0125  0.0217  0.0157* 
[0.0195]  [0.0092]  [0.0131]  [0.0090] 
fem_hh  -0.0083  -0.0939  0.0752  -0.0559 
[0.0941]  [0.1028]  [0.0966]  [0.0957] 
hh_edu  0.0036  -0.0021  0.0130**  0.0001 
[0.0070]  [0.0085]  [0.0062]  [0.0036] 
hh_age  0.0004  -0.0036  -0.0059**  -0.0009 
[0.0025]  [0.0027]  [0.0027]  [0.0026] 
h_floor  -0.0002  0.0866  0.0896  0.0412 
[0.0609]  [0.0581]  [0.0714]  [0.0246] 
drainge  0.0774*  0.0249  -0.0021  -0.0049 
[0.0382]  [0.0558]  [0.0678]  [0.0318] 
land_val  -0.012  -0.0181  -0.0364*  0.0075 
[0.0274]  [0.0185]  [0.0209]  [0.0050] 
livestock_val  -0.1923  -0.244  0.5245  -0.1608 
[0.9774]  [0.3351]  [0.5075]  [0.1831] 
fulltime_ehhm_no  -0.0337  0.0007  0.0002  -0.0366 
[0.0384]  [0.0263]  [0.0480]  [0.0288] 
remittance  0.0008  -0.0109  0.0556  0.0516* 
[0.0939]  [0.0634]  [0.0718]  [0.0264] 
fldaffected_hh  0.1081  0.0616  0.0678  0.0074 
[0.0717]  [0.0538]  [0.0444]  [0.0316] 
No PHKN treatment 
dummy for C 1  0.0164  0.0023  -0.1595**  -0.0122 
[0.0792]  [0.0542]  [0.0654]  [0.0239] 
dummy for C 2  0.0706  -0.0122  -0.0688  -0.0626 
[0.0814]  [0.0583]  [0.0706]  [0.0493] 
Age controls  Polynomials upto the 5th, age in months  Full set of age (in years) dummies 
R-squared  0.118  0.257  0.258  0.077 
F-statistics  7.981  3.739  6.675  2.394 
Level of Significance  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.016 
Number of observations  95  97  174  177 
Notes: See Table 12. 
41Appendix Table 6. Correlates of labor force participation (individual-level regression results) 
Dep.var = d_work (engaged in 
market-oriented work), adults aged 
20-60 
Females  Males 
Household demographic and asset characteristics 
hhsize  -0.0126***  -0.0305*** 
[0.0039]  [0.0050] 
fem_hh  0.1061**  0.0177 
[0.0466]  [0.0609] 
hh_edu  0.0034  -0.0074* 
[0.0022]  [0.0036] 
hh_age  0.0014*  0 
[0.0007]  [0.0011] 
h_floor  -0.0243  -0.0061 
[0.0206]  [0.0476] 
drainge  -0.0132  -0.0608** 
[0.0143]  [0.0235] 
land_val  -0.003  -0.0111 
[0.0049]  [0.0072] 
livestock_val  -0.1480**  0.1757 
[0.0695]  [0.1269] 
fulltime_ehhm_no  0.0347**  0.1170*** 
[0.0142]  [0.0130] 
remittance  0.0205  -0.0577* 
[0.0150]  [0.0329] 
fldaffected_hh  0.0076  0.0281 
[0.0138]  [0.0296] 
No PHKN treatment 
dummy for C 1  -0.0337*  0.0132 
[0.0170]  [0.0209] 
dummy for C 2  -0.0294  0.0344 
[0.0218]  [0.0355] 
Individual characteristics 
educ_yrs  0.0083***  0.0063 
[0.0020]  [0.0054] 
(educ_yrs - mean(educ_yrs))^2  0.0010*  -0.0004 
[0.0005]  [0.0010] 
age  0.0023***  0.0085*** 
[0.0007]  [0.0016] 
(age - mean(age))^2  -0.0002***  -0.0011*** 
[0.0000]  [0.0001] 
R-squared  0.128  0.166 
F-statistics  3.697  39.889 
Level of Significance  0.000  0.000 
Number of observations  902  961 
Notes: 1. Estimated by OLS (i.e., linear probability model), with robust standard errors 
clustered at the village level (reported in brackets). 2. * p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. 
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